Is Direct FDI in Healthcare Desirable in a Developing Economy? by Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Mukhopadhyay, Ujjaini
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is Direct FDI in Healthcare Desirable in
a Developing Economy?
Sarbajit Chaudhuri and Ujjaini Mukhopadhyay
University of Calcutta, Behala College
3 September 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41007/
MPRA Paper No. 41007, posted 3 September 2012 10:00 UTC
 1 
Is Direct FDI in Healthcare Desirable in a Developing Economy? 
 
 
Sarbajit Chaudhuri, Professor, Dept. of Economics, University of Calcutta 
and 
Ujjaini Mukhopadhyay, Dept. of Economics, Behala College, Kolkata, India 
 
Address for communication: Dr. Sarbajit Chaudhuri, 23 Dr. P.N. Guha Road, 
Belgharia, Kolkata 700083, India. Tel: 91-33-2541-0455 (R), 91-33-2557-5082 
(C.U.). Fax: 91-33-2844-1490 (P). E-mail: sarbajitch@yahoo.com 
 
(This version: 03 September 2012) 
 
Abstract: We develop a three-sector general equilibrium model and attempt to 
examine the impact of FDI in healthcare sector on the welfare and human capital 
stock of the economy. The greater the size of the healthcare sector the higher and 
better would be the medical facilities available to each member of the population. 
Better medical facilities must produce positive effects on workers’ general health and 
productivity.  The greater the size of the healthcare sector the higher is the efficiency 
of labour. There are two types of capital: capital of type K and capital of type N. 
While capital of type K is used in production of all the sectors of the economy, capital 
of type N is specific to the healthcare sector. Our analysis finds that an FDI of capital 
of type N although raises the human capital formation may lower social welfare. On 
the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital of type K is likely to be welfare-improving. 
Although these effects crucially hinge on different structural factors e.g. the degree of 
labour market imperfection, trade-related and technological factors these can at least 
question the desirability of allowing the entry of foreign capital in the healthcare 
sector directly.  
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Is Direct FDI in Healthcare Desirable in a Developing Economy? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that transpired after the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations of 1994 has led to significant international 
developments in the service sector. Prior to the GATS, international trade essentially 
involved movements of goods since these can be stored and therefore transported  
(Woodward, 2002). While the global trade of services like banking, 
telecommunications and education has been growing rapidly, the impact of trade and 
foreign direct investment in an important service-oriented sector, the healthcare 
sector, in the post liberalization period has undergone a phenomenal change. GATS 
specifies four ‘modes of supply’: (i) ‘cross-border supply’, where the service, but 
neither producer or consumer, crosses a border (e.g. telemedicine); (ii) ‘consumption 
abroad’, where the consumer crosses a border to obtain a service (e.g. medical 
‘tourism’); (iii) ‘commercial presence’, where companies make FDI in the service 
sector of another economy (e.g. a foreign company investing in a domestic hospital); 
and (iv) ‘temporary movement of service providers’, where skilled workers move to 
other countries to work for a limited period (Smith, 2004). Of these, commercial 
presence is supposed to be the most critical (Sinclair and Grieshaber- Otto, 2002).  
 
The healthcare sector has historically been publicly funded due to its vital role in the 
context of human development and the commitments of governments to provide 
universal access to health services at low cost. The GATS commitment dissuades the 
existence of public health services in both developing and developed countries by 
driving them to open up their service sectors to international trade. The healthcare 
system has experienced a transition towards creation of market payment and incentive 
systems in public provision (marketisation) and shift over time in the balance of assets 
between public and private through investment (privatization) (Semboja and 
Thirkildsen, 1995). 
 
The healthcare sector in developing countries has expanded manifold and is expected 
to flourish even more due to growing population, increasing lifestyle related health 
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issues and thrust on medical tourism. The increased affordability of healthcare for 
consumers due to rising incomes and improving health insurance penetration is likely 
to transform into a highly dynamic sector. However, the public provision of health 
services considerably lags behind in these countries. According to recently released 
National Health Accounts (NHA) statistics in India, public health expenditure as a 
share of GDP increased from 0.96 per cent in 2004-05 to just 1.01 per cent in 2008-09 
as compared to five per cent for high-income countries (Chanda, 2002).  The public 
health sector is plagued by inefficiencies and lack of physical infrastructure. The 
mismatch between demand and supply of healthcare services and infrastructure has 
triggered the emergence of private participation in the provision of healthcare. For 
example, the private sector accounts for around 80 per cent of healthcare delivery in 
India. An estimated 60 per cent of hospitals, 75 per cent of dispensaries, and 80 per 
cent of all qualified doctors are in the private sector (Chanda, 2008). 
 
In most of the developing countries, the healthcare sector lags behind international 
benchmarks for physical infrastructure and manpower and needs to scale up 
considerably in terms of the availability and quality of its physical infrastructure as 
well as human resources. Therefore, the growing potential of the sector coupled with 
the boost in privatisation of the sector and the huge infrastructure needs make 
investment in the healthcare sector a highly lucrative venture and have resulted in 
increased foreign players to enter the market.1 Outreville (2007) identifies some of the 
determinants of foreign investment of the largest MNCs operating in the healthcare 
industry. 
 
Evidence on the changing pattern and extent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
health care is erratic since it is difficult to distinguish health care investment from 
other service sector FDI (Fujita 2002). However, some anecdotal evidences suggest 
rising investment (Chanda 2002). The increase in substantial investment from Europe 
and the US into middle income countries in Latin America, Asia and higher income 
transition countries (Fujita, 2002; Waitzkin and Iriart, 2001) and the emergence of 
Asian based MNCs such as Singapore-based Parkway (Lethbridge, 2002) are 
                                               
1
 However, there are important constraints like high cost involved in setting up hospitals, long 
gestation period and the relatively low returns on investment that may act as deterrence for 
healthcare sector as destinations for foreign investment. 
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indicative of augmented role cross country investment in healthcare. In India, 
reportedly at least 20 international players are competing for a share in the hospitals 
and medical devices segment; about 90 per cent of the demand in the hi-tech medical 
devices segment accounting for $770 million is met by imports from the US, Japan, 
and Germany (Chanda, 2008).  
 
However, empirical evidence on the likely impact of FDI in health service is virtually 
non-existent. Most of the literature is analytical in nature, with an apparent 
polarization of views for and against FDI in the sector2. The proponents of 
liberalisation in healthcare assert that FDI provides an impetus to increase physical 
capacity and infrastructure development such as bed strength, number of speciality 
and super speciality centres, number of diagnostic centres. It acts as a catalyst in 
raising the standards and quality of healthcare, in spreading the impact of 
technological change on drugs and medical technology through market integration 
and in creating employment opportunities benefiting the health sector and the 
economy at large (Mackintosh, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, it is argued that the opening up of health service to the 
international market will affect the universal rights to services that people experience 
in relation to public services like health. The use of commercial and business practices 
in the health sector make it vulnerable to being considered a business activity and so 
liable to the same requirements to open its services to competition (Lethbridge, 2003). 
The presence of foreign commercial firms with higher levels of pay and equipments 
may persuade personnel away from public facilities leading to an ‘internal’ brain 
drain (WHO, 2002; Mehmet 2002). Liberalisation of health provision, by allowing the 
better off to choose the private sector, may release public sector resources for the poor 
on the one hand and engender a ‘two-tier’ system, with high quality care for the rich 
and poor quality for the poor (Pollock and Price, 2000) on the other, reinforcing 
polarisation and stratification. 
 
                                               
2
 See Smith (2004) for a detailed review of literature. 
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The impact of FDI depends on the structure of the healthcare market, that is, whether 
it is ‘commercial’3 or not (White and Collyer, 1998); the regulatory environment in 
healthcare (Lipson, 2001a,b) like standards of health care, establishments, 
professional accreditation and mutual recognition, cross-subsidization policies, pro-
poor regulations, etc.; the status of the health sector in neighbouring countries, since it 
may also provide opportunities for more regional trade in health services via FDI, as 
evident the provision of hospital services across countries in South East Asia 
(Chanda, 2002; Janjararoen and Supakankunti, 2002). 
 
Keeping in view the fact that foreign investment in healthcare has gained considerable 
momentum and it may generate both positive and negative effects, it is essential to 
formally investigate the effects on the welfare of the economy in a theoretical 
framework. However, theoretical literature regarding this aspect is nearly non-
existent. The present paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model and 
attempts to examine the impact of FDI in healthcare sector on the welfare and human 
capital stock of the economy. The greater the size of the healthcare sector the higher 
and better would be the medical facilities available to each member of the population. 
Better medical facilities must produce positive effects on workers’ general health and 
productivity.  It is, therefore, sensible to assume that the labour efficiency is higher, 
the greater is the size of the healthcare sector.4 There are two types of capital: capital 
of type K and capital of type N. While capital of type K is used in production of all 
the sectors of the economy, capital of type N is specific to the healthcare sector. Our 
analysis finds that an FDI of capital of type N although raises the human capital 
formation may lower social welfare. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital of 
type K is likely to be welfare-improving. Although these effects crucially hinge on 
different structural factors e.g. the degree of labour market imperfection, trade-related 
and technological factors these can at least question the desirability of allowing the 
entry of foreign capital in the healthcare sector. Also these results have important 
                                               
3
 ‘Commercialisation’ of health care refers to the increasing provision of health care services 
through market relationships to those able to pay; the associated investment in and production 
of those services for the purpose of cash income or profit; an increase in the extent to which 
health care finance is derived from payment systems based in individual payment or private 
insurance (Mackintosh, 2003). 
 
4
 See also footnote 8 in this context. 
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policy implications for an overpopulated developing country with subsidized but 
inadequate medical facilities.     
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a small open economy consisting of three sectors. Sector 1 produces an 
agricultural commodity ( 1X ) with labour ( L ) and capital of type K . Sector 2 uses 
labour and capital of type K to produce a manufacturing commodity ( 2X ). Sector 3 is 
the healthcare sector that uses labour and both types of capital to provide health 
services.5 It is assumed that sector 1 is the export sector, sector 2 is the tariff-
protected import-competing sector, and sector 3 is the service sector producing 
‘healthcare’ that is non-traded6 and consumed domestically. While labour is 
imperfectly mobile capital of type K is perfectly mobile between all the sectors of the 
economy. Capital of type N is specific to the healthcare sector and is entirely owned 
by foreign capitalists7 so that the return from it is fully repatriated. All the factors of 
production are fully employed. It is sensible to assume that capital of type N 
(precision medical equipments) and labour are not substitutes in sector G so that 
0G GNL LNS S= = . However, the two types of capital are substitutes to a very little extent 
so that , 0G GNK KNS S >  but very small. Workers in the agricultural sector earn 
competitive wage W , while the wage rates in the manufacturing and healthcare 
sectors *W  are institutionally determined, and *W W> . Due to the assumption of a 
small economy, prices of commodities 1 and 2 are internationally given. As 
                                               
5
 Capital of type N includes advanced and precision medical equipments like cardiac 
pacemakers and valves, defibrillators, and stents; electromedical therapeutic, monitoring, and 
imaging devices and apparatus; in vitro diagnostics; and implantable orthopedic and 
prosthetic devices and appliances. The United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan 
together account for about 90 percent of global production of medical devices, a lion’s share 
of which comes to the developing countries with FDI in the healthcare sector (USITC 2007).  
 
6
 Trade liberalization of health service is a prominent feature of GATS commitments. For 
example, medical tourism and aspects of e-health, including teleradiology, telediagnostics, 
telepathology have gained increased importance in recent years. However, this paper does not 
consider trade in health services.   
 
7
 This is only a simplifying assumption. It may be intuitively checked that the qualitative 
results of the model remain unaltered even if the stock of capital of type N consists of both 
domestic and foreign capital which are perfect substitutes.  
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commodity (services) 3 is internationally non-traded its price is determined 
domestically by demand and supply forces. Production functions in sector 1 and in 
sector 2 exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to 
each factor. Commodity 1 is assumed to be the numeraire. As has been already 
discussed , 0G GLN NLS S = and , 0
G G
NK KNS S ≅ .  
 
The following symbols will be used in the formal presentation of the model. 
Lia = labour-output ratio in the i  th sector, i = 1, 2, G ; Kia = capital of type K - output 
ratio in the i  th sector, i = 1, 2, G ; NGa = capital of type N - output ratio in sector G ; 
2P  = exogenously given world price of good 2; t = ad-valorem tariff rate on the 
import of good 2; *2 2 (1 )P P t= +  = domestic or tariff inclusive price of commodity 2; 
GP  =  endogenously determined domestic price of the service produced in sector G ; 
W = competitive wage rate of labour (per efficiency unit of labour); *W =  
institutionally determined wage rate of labour (per efficiency unit of labour); r = 
return to capital of type K ; R = return to capital of type N ; iX = output level of the i  
th sector, i  = 1, 2, G ; L  = labour endowment of the economy in physical units; DK  
= amount of domestic stock of capital of type K ; FK  = amount of foreign stock of 
capital of type K ; K = aggregate stock of capital of type K  (i.e. D FK K K= + ); N  = 
amount of capital stock of type N (foreign-owned); h  = efficiency of a representative 
worker; s  = ad-valorem rate of subsidy on the consumption of service G ; 
* (1 )G GP s P= −  = effective/ subsidised consumer price of service G ; z  = lump-sum 
(exogenously given) subsidy on healthcare; Y  = national income at domestic prices; 
jiθ = distributive share of the j  th input in the i th sector, i  =1, 2,G ; , ,j L K N= ; 
jiλ = proportion of the j th input employed in the i  th sector, i  =1, 2, 
G ; , ,j L K N= ; ijkS = the degree of substitution between factors j  and k  in the i th 
sector, 1, 2i = ,G  with 0ijkS >  for j k≠  and 0ijjS < .; * 22 ( )
D
m P
Y
∂
= =
∂
marginal 
propensity to consume commodity 2; [(1 ) /{1 (1 )] 1v t t m= + + − > ; M = is the volume 
of import of good 2; ^ = proportionate change, for example, 1 1 1ˆ ( / )X dX X= . 
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The general equilibrium is represented by the following set of equations. 
 
 
1 1 1L KWa ra+ =          (1) 
*
2 2 2 (1 )L KW a ra P t+ = +   (2) 
*
LG KG NG GW a ra Ra P+ + =   (3) 
 
Equations (1) – (3) are the competitive industry equilibrium conditions in the three 
sectors. 
 
The consumers receive a subsidy on the consumption of the healthcare services 
(commodity G ) at the ad-valorem rate, s . So the effective price of commodity G that 
the consumers face is * (1 )G GP P s= − . This subsidy is financed by a portion of the tariff 
revenue earned by the government from the import of commodity 2.8 
 
The efficiency of each worker is considered to be a positive function of the total 
health services produced9 and is given by 
'( ); 0Gh h X h= >  (4) 
 
Hence the labour endowment in efficiency unit is given by 
1 1 2 2 ( )L L LG G Ga X a X a X h X L+ + =  (5) 
 
                                               
8
 In the standard trade theory, it is usually assumed that the government collects the tariff 
revenue from the import of the importable commodity (commodity 2 in the present case) and 
pays it back to the consumers in a lump-sum manner. In this case, from the aggregate tariff 
revenue the government holds back z amount (exogenously fixed) for financing the health 
subsidy and the rest is transferred to the consumers in a non-distortionary fashion.  
 
9
 It is assumed that the efficiency of a worker depends on his health condition. This is 
particularly true in the developing countries, where dearth of adequate medical facilities and 
infrastructure impinges severely on the health of workers, leading to deterioration in their 
efficiency or productivity. Therefore, an expansion in the healthcare sector is expected to 
raise their efficiency. 
 
 9 
It should be pointed out at this stage that sector G uses LG Ga X efficiency units of 
labour apart from two types of capital in its production to produce GX  units of 
healthcare services. As production of commodity G raises the efficiency of each 
worker, this sector can be considered to be a supplier of labour input in efficiency 
unit. If GX rises by one per cent sector G employs LGλ per cent of the labour force 
additionally while it raises the labour force in efficiency unit by Gε per cent in the 
margin, where (.)( . ) 0(.)
G
G
G
Xdh
dX h
ε = > is the elasticity of the labour efficiency 
function, ( )Gh X , with respect to GX . It is sensible to assume that sector G is a net 
supplier of labour input in efficiency unit which implies that LG Gλ ε< . 
 
Complete utilization of capital of types K  and N  can be expressed respectively as 
1 1 2 2K K KG G D Fa X a X a X K K K+ + = + =  (6) 
NG Ga X N=  (7) 
 
Capital of either type K  includes both domestic capital and foreign capital, which are 
perfect substitutes. Capital of type N  is completely owned by foreign capitalists.10 
Foreign capital incomes of both types are fully repatriated. 
 
The endogenously determined demand function for healthcare services is given by 
*( , )
               (-) (+)
G G GD D P Y=
 (8) 
This implies that the demand for the healthcare services has the usual price and 
income effects. 
                
The subsidy on healthcare ( z ) is financed by a portion of the tariff revenue earned by 
the government from the import of commodity 2 and is given by 
G GsP D z=  (9) 
 
                                               
10
 See footnote 7 in this context.  
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The demand function for the import commodity is given by 
*
2 2 2( , )
              (-) (+) 
D D P Y=
   (10) 
 
All commodities are normal goods with negative and positive own price and income 
elasticities of demand, respectively. CommodityG  is a necessary good having a low 
own price elasticity of demand (in absolute terms). It does not depend on the relative 
price of commodity 2, *2P , so that the cross-price elasticity is zero. We make the 
simplifying assumption that the demands for the other two commodities do not 
depend on the relative price of commodityG i.e. 1 2
* *
( ), ( ) 0
G G
D D
P P
∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
.
11
 Commodities 1 
and 2 are, however, gross substitutes implying 1
*
2
( ) 0D
P
∂
>
∂
. 
 
The national income at domestic prices is given by 
*
1 2 2 2 2 2( )G G FY X P X P X tP D X rK RN z= + + + − − − −  (11) 
or equivalently, 
*
1 1 1 1 2 2 2( ( ) ) ( )L G L DY Wa X W h X L a X rK tP D X z= + − + + − −  (11.1) 
where 2 2 2[ ( ) ]tP D X z− − is the tariff revenue net of the subsidy on sectorG which is 
transferred to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion.  
     
Since the healthcare service is consumed domestically, its supply is circumscribed by 
its demand. Therefore, in equilibrium, we have 
G GD X=  (12) 
 
There are twelve endogenous variables, 1 2 2, , , , , , , , , ,G G GW r R P s h X X X D D  and Y  that 
can be solved from the above twelve equations. r  and W  are obtained from equations 
                                               
11
 It may be verified that even if the demands for the other two commodities depend 
positively on *GP , implying commodities to be gross substitutes, all the results of the model 
continue to hold under an additional sufficient condition involving the term, 2
*
( )
G
D
P
∂
∂
. See 
footnote 13 and footnote 15 in this context. 
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(2) and (1) respectively. R  is determined from equation (3) as a function of GP . Then 
GX  is solved from equation (7) as a function of GP . Plugging the value of GX  in 
equations ((5) and (6) and solving yield the values of 1X  and 2X . The value of Y  is 
determined from solving equations (10) and (11.1). Substituting Y  in equation (8) the 
value of GD  as a function of GP  is obtained. Finally, the value of GP  is determined 
from equation (12). Once GP  is known, the values of the other variables are also 
known. This is an indecomposable system, where the factor prices, except W and r , 
cannot be solved from the price system alone. Therefore, any change in the factor 
endowments affect factor prices, which in turn, affect the per unit input requirements, 
jia s  in each sector. 
 
The demand side of the model is represented by a strictly quasi-concave social 
welfare function. Let V  denote the social welfare that depends on the consumption of 
the output of the three sectors denoted by 1D , 2D and GD , and is depicted as 
1 2( , , )GV V D D D=                   (13) 
 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that 
1 2 2 1 2 2 FD P D X P X rK RN+ = + − −  (14) 
or equivalently, 
* * *
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( )G G G G FD P D P D X P X P X tP D X rK RN z+ + = + + + − − − −  (14.1)
                                           
The volume of import of good 2 is given by the following equation. 
* *
2 2 2( , , )GM D P P Y X= −            (15)                                                                          
 
3. Comparative Static Exercises 
 
In the present model where the efficiency of labour is determined endogenously by 
the magnitude of the healthcare sector, increase in the inflow of foreign capital of 
both types would raise the capital endowment of the economy leading to changes in 
factor prices, input coefficients and output composition. Any change in the size of the 
healthcare sector affects the labour efficiency, which in turn changes the labour 
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endowment in the economy measured in efficiency units. In this section, we examine 
the effects of foreign capital of both types on (i) the welfare of the economy in the 
presence of a concomitant change in labour endowment and (ii) the stock of human 
capital in the economy. 
 
Human capital stock C  can be expressed as the total labour endowment of the 
economy in efficiency units. Therefore, 
( )GC h X L=  (16) 
 
3.1  Effects of inflow of capital of type K  
 
In order to examine the effects of an inflow of capital of type K  on the welfare and 
human capital stock of the economy, it is assumed that ˆ 0K > , while all other 
parameters remain unchanged. 
 
Differentiating Equations (1) – (3), (5) – (10), (11.1), (12), (13), (14.1), (15) and (16) 
the following results can be proved.12 
(i) 
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
GP
K
>  iff * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− > ; 
(ii) 1
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
K
< ; and, 2
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
K
> ; iff * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− >  
(iii) 
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( )( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
G
G NN G
NG
X S P
K Kθ
= − >  iff * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− > ;  
(iv) 
1
1( ) 0dV
D dK
>  if (a) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ;                                                (17) 
              (b) ( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥ ; and, 
(v) 0dC
dK
>  iff * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− >       
 
From (17) the following proposition can now be established. 
                                               
12
 The derivations and sufficient conditions can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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Proposition 1: An inflow of foreign capital of type K leads to (i) an increase in the 
producer price of the healthcare services; (ii) an expansion of the health sector;(iii) 
an expansion (a contraction) of sector 2 (sector 1) and, (iv) an increase in human 
capital if and only if  * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− > . Besides, inflows of this type of capital are 
welfare-improving if (a) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ; and, (b) ( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥ .13 
 
From (17) the following corollaries readily follow. 
Corollary 1: When *W W= , that is, there is no labour market distortion,
1
1( ) 0dV
D dK
<  
if ( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥ .  
Corollary 2: When 0t = , that is, there is no tariff restriction, 
1
1( ) 0dV
D dK
>  if 
( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥ .  
 
From corollary 1 it entails that the presence of any labour market imperfection is a 
necessity for inflows of foreign capital of type K to be welfare improving. On the 
other hand, from corollary 2 it is evident that in the absence of any tariff welfare 
improves if GNNS is sufficiently small. 
 
We can intuitively explain the results presented in proposition1 and corollaries 1 and 
2 in the following fashion. Sector 1 and sector 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin 
sub-system (HOSS) as they use the same two inputs. Furthermore, given the return to 
capital of type N i.e. R , sector 2 and sector G also effectively form a HOSS. An 
inflow of capital of type K, leads to a contraction of sector 1 and an expansion of 
sector 2 following a Rybczynski effect as the latter sector is more intensive in the use 
of capital of type K than the former. Besides, sector G expands if GNNS is sufficiently 
small. As sector 1 contracts, more labour (in efficiency unit) are now absorbed in the 
two higher wage-paying, unionized sectors (sector 2 and sector G). This is the labour 
                                               
13
 If all commodities are gross substitutes we have 2
*
( ) 0
G
D
P
∂
>
∂
. It can be verified that the 
necessary and sufficient condition under which the results of proposition 1 are obtained does 
not change. 
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reallocation effect (LRE) that raises the aggregate wage income and works positively 
on social welfare. As the healthcare sector (sector G) expands it also raises the 
aggregate labour force in efficiency unit and hence increases the aggregate wage 
income given the output levels of the different sectors. This we call the labour 
endowment effect (LEE) which also works favourably on welfare. There is, however, 
an offsetting effect which is called the tariff revenue (TRE) which produces a 
negative effect on social welfare. As sector 2 expands it lowers the volume of import 
and hence the tariff revenue net of health subsidy which is transferred to the 
consumers in a non-distortionary manner. This, TRE, works negatively on welfare. As 
has been discussed previously, sector G must not fall sufficiently and lead to a decline 
in the labour force in efficiency unit adequately for welfare to improve. If the 
condition, ( ( 1) ) 0,GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥  ensures that labour force does not fall sufficiently 
and the LEE is not adequately negative so that welfare deteriorates despite LRE 
dominates over the TRE. Given very limited substitutability between the two types of 
capital, R increases and NGa rises, sector G can contract only if NGa rises sufficiently. If 
G
NNS is very small, NGa cannot adequately rise to bring about a fall in ( ).G
NG
NX
a
= If the 
LRE is stronger relative to the TRE, 2 2( * ) ,LW W a tP− > and the net outcome of the 
three effects would be an improvement in social welfare. 
 
An inflow of foreign capital of type K raises national welfare in two ways: (i) through 
an LRE; and (ii) an LEE provided GNNS is sufficiently small. On the contrary, social 
welfare decreases following a TRE. Natinal welfare finally improves if the LRE is 
stronger than the TRE. If it happens, the demand for the healthcare services rises that 
pushes up its producer price, GP . If GP  rises, sector G expands that raises the efficiency 
of each worker and hence the labour endowment of the economy in efficiency unit. 
 
In the absence of any labour market distortions, the LRE is zero. So ( ) 0GdP
dK
<  if 
( ( 1) ) 0.GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥ Here ( ) 0G
dX
dK
< that implies that the LEE is negative. Welfare 
worsens following both negative TRE and negative LEE. 
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In the absence of any tariff restrictions, there is no negative TRE. So welfare 
improves if ( ( 1) ) 0.GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥        
 
3.2 Effects of inflow of foreign capital of type N  
 
Let us now find out of the consequences of an inflow of foreign capital of type N 
which is specific to the health sector. In this case it is assumed that ˆ 0N > , while all 
other parameters remain unchanged. 
 
Differentiating Equations (1) – (3), (5) – (13), (14.1), (15) and (16) once more the 
following results can be proved.14 
 
(vi) 
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
GP
N
< ;  
(vii) 
ˆ ˆ
( ) 1 ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
G
G NN G
NG
X S P
N Nθ
= − > ;           
 (viii) 1
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
N
< ; and 2
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
X
N
>  and    
 (ix) 0dC
dN
>  if (i) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ; and,      (18) 
                        (ii) ,G GNN KNS S , GNKS 0≅ . 
 
 (x) 
1
1( ) 0dV
D dN
<  if  (i) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥   
                                  (ii) ,G GNN KNS S , GNKS 0≅ ; and,  
                     (iii) ( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥          
 
These results can be summarized in terms of the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital of type N (specific to healthcare) lowers 
the producer price of the healthcare services, expands the health sector and raises 
                                               
14
 The derivations and sufficient conditions can be obtained from the authors on request. 
. 
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human capital if * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥  and GNNS  is small.  It lowers the social welfare if 
additionally, ( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥ .15  
                                                    
The following corollary also follows from (18). 
Corollary 3: In the absence of any tariff welfare unambiguously deteriorates 
following an inflow of foreign capital of type N. 
 
Capital of type N is specific to sector G. If there occurs an inflow of this type of 
capital sector G expands. On the other hand, as N increases, R decreases and NGa rises. 
This halts the expansion of sector G to some extent. However, if GNNS is relatively 
small, GX rises leading to a fall in its producer price given its demand. The expanding 
sector G requires more capital of type K which must come from the other two sectors 
leading to a Rybczynski type effect (RTE). Consequently, sector 2 contracts while 
sector 1 expands as the former sector is more intensive in the use of capital of type K 
vis-à-vis sector 1. If sector G expands the human capital formation gets a boost. 
Finally, national income at domestic prices rises due to an LEE and a positive TRE 
while it decreases owing to an LRE as the tariff-protected as the tariff –protected 
import-competing sector (sector 2) contracts. So there are three different effects 
onY emanating due to three different reasons. The net effect would be a fall in social 
welfare subject to the sufficient conditions as mentioned in proposition 2. 
 
4. Policy implications of results and concluding remarks: 
 
The present paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model and attempts to 
examine the impact of FDI in healthcare sector on the welfare and human capital 
stock of the economy. The consequences of two types of FDI have been considered 
here. Capital of type K is used in all the three sectors of the economy while capital of 
type N is solely used in the healthcare sector. In a developing country with formal and 
informal division of the labour market, due to an inflow of foreign capital of K type, 
                                               
15
 If commodities are gross substitutes the welfare result holds subject to the following two 
sufficient conditions: (i) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ; and, (ii) 22 *( )G
G
DX tP v
P
∂≥
∂
. 
 17 
both the human capital formation and social welfare increase if the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that (a) * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ ; and, (b) ( 1) 0GNG NNv sSθ − + ≥  are 
satisfied. Policy implications that readily follow are not to go for labour market 
reform but to go for trade liberalization that lowers the tariff rates. These types of 
reforms fortify the possibility that the condition, * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ , would be 
satisfied. On the contrary, owing to an inflow of foreign capital of N type (specific to 
sector G), social welfare deteriorates if * 2 2( ) LW W a tP− ≥ . So trade liberalization 
raises the possibility for this kind of foreign capital inflows to be welfare worsening. 
These results are important because they can at least question the desirability of 
allowing foreign capital inflows in the healthcare directly, especially, when inflows of 
foreign capital (of K type) that go to all the sectors of the economy are likely to work 
favourably on twin economic objectives: maintaining high economic growth and 
improvement in human capital formation.  
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